The revelation of an assassination attempt on the Saudi ambassador to the U.S. is the latest testament to the struggle unfolding, usually behind the scenes, between Iran and Saudi Arabia. This is a struggle for regional influence and for standing in the Muslim world that also contains within it geo-strategic and ethnic considerations. Yet the current affair, which is taking place against the backdrop of earlier tensions between the two countries, has taken their relations to a new low and has the potential to transform the conflict to one that is open and direct - more than ever before. Relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia have been especially tense since March of this year, when Saudi Arabia deployed forces in Bahrain to help the ruling Sunni al-Khalifa family suppress the Shiite uprising on the island - an uprising perceived as an Iranian initiative - and prevent it from spilling over to the Shiite areas in eastern Saudi Arabia. When the anti-government protests intensified in Syria and took on a sectarian nature, Saudi Arabia stood at the forefront of Iranian ally Bashar Assad's opponents, and began to actively assist the rebels. Saudi Arabia views Iran as one of its main threats. First, Iran seeks to promote a different security structure in the Gulf, one that is void of foreign involvement, first and foremost American intervention, and one in which Iran plays a leadership role. Second, Iran considers itself the true representative of the Muslim world, thereby challenging Riyadh's role as the guardian of "Muslim holy places." In addition, Iran's quest for nuclear weapons and the influence this capability will have in shaping the regional agenda threatens Riyadh in a number of ways - from the potential influence Iran will have in the oil market to the "tail wind" that Shiites in its domain will receive. Shiites living in Saudi Arabia have never threatened the regime, but this could change. Earlier this month, they first took up arms. Riots that erupted near the large oil terminal at Ras Tanura led the Saudis to blame a "foreign state" (a code name for Iran) and to forcefully suppress the demonstrations.
Since the start of the Arab Spring, Saudi Arab has made some significant achievements in its struggle against Iran, and more than before Iran is perceived as a negative force in the Gulf, which stems from its support of Shiite unrest. The incitement of inter-ethnic strife is not beneficial to Iran, which seeks to focus attention on Israel and divert it from the Sunni-Shiite struggle. The results of the protest have thus far proven its limited power and its difficulty in providing assistance to communities that enjoy its support.
Meanwhile, the "Quds" force of Iran's Revolutionary Guards - which was established in the early 1990s to promote Tehran's interests abroad through various means - maintains a set of "sleeper cells," particularly among Shiite communities. Yet Iran has denied direct involvement in terrorist attacks carried out in the West out of concern that its image will be damaged, and has held on to these assets for the "day of reckoning." The negative potential of events in Syria for Iranian regional influence could push Tehran into a corner and cause it to "ignite" various parts of the Middle East and beyond.
Indeed, the suspicion that Iran was behind the assassination attempt on the Saudi envoy did not emerge from a vacuum. In recent months the U.S. has accused Iran of ramping up attacks on soldiers withdrawing from Iraq and using its vessels in the Gulf as a provocation - acts that have the potential to spark a wider conflict.
The upheaval in the Arab world has revealed the depth of the Iranian-Saudi rivalry and perhaps even amplified it. Saudi assertiveness in Bahrain, and even in relation to Syria, has exposed it more than ever to Iranian threats. Both sides are still interested in keeping their conflict behind the scenes, but the plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in the U.S. will increase Saudi Arabia's determination to stand more forcefully against Iran. It gives Saudi Arabia leverage to influence players like China and Russia to coordinate their policies toward Assad and Iran. This attempt also demonstrates, once again, the related interests between Israel and the Sunni bloc that Saudi Arabia leads.
The writer is a research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University.
