The images arriving from the Ukraine are starting to look like a civil war. As usual, the reality is much more complicated than it is portrayed in the media, but it could be that a true civil war and maybe even a Russian incursion are around the corner. At any rate, if Russian President Vladimir Putin wants to invade the Ukraine or increase his involvement there, a civil war is the picture he wants to construct to justify his actions. The Kremlin itself is taking an active part in creating that picture by supporting the pro-Russian isolationists and the propaganda that the Russian media is broadcasting to the citizens of Russia and southeast Ukraine.
Indeed, the more time passes, the more momentum the Russian propaganda is gaining and the more extreme its messages are growing. It is full of bias, lies, and mainly fear mongering. The pro-Ukrainian forces are dubbed "punishment units" -- a term generally used for Nazi acts of retribution against the civilian population of German-occupied territories in World War II. Supporters of the Kiev regime are called "fascists" and the new government itself a "junta." The tragedy in Odessa is compared to the Khatyn massacre, a legendary event in Russian history of the Second World War, when Nazis and their Ukrainian burned the residents of the village of Khatyn, in the Minsk region, alive as punishment for opposition by the local partisans. The parallels that Russia's propaganda is trying to draw to today's events are clear.
Why this extremist propaganda? Putin wants to slander the other side, to eradicate its legitimacy once and for all. At the same time, he wants to fan the flames in the Ukraine itself, thus justifying any possible future action. Right now, this is his immediate interest. It must be understood that thus far, resistance and active isolationism in the Ukraine have not been as widespread as they have been presented in media reports and as Putin would have us believe. Geographically, they are concentrated in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and were almost exclusive to these areas until the events in Odessa.
It is difficult to determine absolutely whether the clash in Odessa was the result of a planned provocation or a chance event, but there are signs that indicate it was planned. This version also fits with the rationale for whipping up the civil conflict in the Ukraine. Moreover, it appears that for now, a large part of the residents of eastern and southern Ukraine, regardless of their political leanings, are remaining passive. Many of those who took up arms in the east are extremists of various kinds and marginalized characters, people looking for adventure, and not necessarily Kremlin pawns.
But it seems that the militias in the east are gradually growing. The more blood that is spilled in clashes and the more the Russian propaganda adds to the fear and hysteria, the more likely we are to see a situation that pushes the hesitating to one extreme or the other, forcing people on the fence to choose a side and act. An ongoing conflict unrestrained by the authorities naturally allows extremists on both sides to rise to the surface and leads people to continually more violent, brutal acts.
These tragedies are what Putin needs to intervene in the Ukraine, if that's what he wants. They provide an excuse for intervention that would protect the persecuted denizens of southern and eastern Ukraine. Many fear that the Russians will choose to invade around May 9, the anniversary of the Nazis' defeat, so that the Russian media myth of fighting the fascists in the Ukraine today will blend in with the historical myth of self-defense and ultimate justice of World War II, justifying action on the neighbor's turf.
Yuri Teper is a lecturer in political science at Ariel University whose work focuses on Russian politics and the post-Soviet space.
