After the initial, somewhat hesitant reaction of European nations and the U.S. to Russian actions, it appears the tone of discourse in the West is changing. The leading powers have finally called a spade a spade. The late-coming American message on Russia's occupation of the Crimean peninsula is official recognition that there has been aggression. Members of the G-8 (other than Russia, of course) have announced they will not attend the Sochi conference. Moreover, John Kerry gave a television interview and mentioned possible sanctions that the U.S. could apply against Russia if the latter didn't cooperate. But it seems that the Russians refuse to be impressed.
And why should they be any more impressed with U.S. threats now than they were last Friday, when the U.S. warned Russia against military interference in the Ukraine crisis? If Putin had believed that interfering in the Ukraine would cost him too much, he wouldn't have deployed his forces the next morning. It isn't a coincidence. In recent years, Western nations, led by the U.S., have a record of a lack of credibility. Their zigzagging surrounding the uprising in Egypt during the Arab Spring, their conduct in negotiations with Iran and of course the U.S.'s embarrassing management of the Syrian chemical weapons crisis have apparently led the Russians to believe they are taking a reasonable risk. What's more, if it becomes clear that the international community is serious, it is always possible to start negotiations about the red line that has been crossed.
The tone arising from the Ukrainian crisis is causing many to hearken back to the Cold War, but we are not about to repeat it. The Americans are not the same Americans and the Russians are certainly not the Soviet Union. Despite their current actions, the Russians do not have resources or global aspirations on the scale that the Soviets did. They still see themselves as a superpower, but as far as Putin is concerned his efforts to keep the Ukraine from moving closer to the West are not an attack, but a rearguard battle. He sees it as protecting his home turf, something that was a nonissue in the Soviet period. The Americans aren't rushing into battle either, and both sides -- no matter how important the Ukraine -- will avoid a real clash.
But in a situation of constant tension, every spark and mistake, any attempt to apply too much pressure or make too great a gambit, could spark an explosion. The ultimatum the Russians gave to Ukrainian forces in Crimea to surrender by morning could have been a potential powder keg. Thus far the crisis has been free from bloodshed, and in the past few days a fragile status quo has settled over the Ukraine. As long as this situation continues, things can change and it will be easier for both sides to reach a deal. On the other hand, extreme violence and casualties could mark a point of no return in the current conflict, as far as an agreement goes. The moment lives are claimed the main players will no longer be acting on their own accord but will be guided by public opinion, which could intensify the struggle.
Beyond that, casualties could prompt extremist groups from the east and west to act independently, beyond the control of the leadership. One such group is the Right Sector, the nationalist Ukrainian organization whose people spearheaded the revolution in Kiev. Unlike the members of the Ukrainian army, there is no doubt about the Right Sector's determination to wage war against Russia if necessary.
Yuri Teper is a lecturer in political science at Ariel University. His work focuses on Russian politics and the post-Soviet space.
טעינו? נתקן! אם מצאתם טעות בכתבה, נשמח שתשתפו אותנו